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Abstract
This paper examines the quantitative implications of government ﬁscal policy in a
discrete-time one-sector growth model with a productive externality that generates so-
cial increasing returns to scale. Starting from a laissez-faire economy that exhibits local
indeterminacy, we show that the introduction of a constant capital tax or subsidy can
lead to various forms of endogenous ﬂuctuations, including stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and 10-cycles,
quasi-periodic orbits, and chaos. In contrast, a constant labor tax or subsidy has no ef-
fect on the qualitative nature of the model’s dynamics. We show that the use of local
steady-state analysis to detect the presence of multiple equilibria in this class of models
can be misleading. For a plausible range of capital tax rates, the log-linearized dynamical
system exhibits saddle-point stability, suggesting a unique equilibrium, while the true non-
linear model exhibits global indeterminacy. This result implies that stabilization policies
designed to suppress sunspot ﬂuctuations near the steady state may not prevent sunspots,
cycles, or chaos in regions away from the steady state. Overall, our results highlight the
importance of using a model’s nonlinear equilibrium conditions to fully investigate global
dynamics.
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It is well-known that a wide variety of equilibrium economic models can exhibit endogenous
cycles, indeterminacy, sunspots, or chaos.1 The conditions needed for such phenomena are
typically less stringent in models with incomplete markets, imperfect competition, or exter-
nalities. These environments also create a motive for government intervention to address the
source of the market failure. In this paper, we show how a government ﬁscal policy designed to
address a wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital (which is created
by a productive externality) can lead to a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is
possible in the laissez-faire economy.
The framework for our analysis is a discrete-time version of the one-sector growth model
developed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994). In one variant of their model, an individual ﬁrm’s
production process is subject to a positive external eﬀect that is linked to the average level of
inputs across all ﬁrms in the economy. Benhabib and Farmer show that when this externality
is strong enough to generate social increasing returns-to-scale, the model can exhibit “local
indeterminacy” whereby a continuum of rational expectations equilibria exists in the neigh-
borhood of the single interior steady state. Such an environment allows for stochastic sunspot
ﬂuctuations driven by “animal spirits.”2 Farmer and Guo (1994) show that a calibrated ver-
sion of this model compares favorably to a standard real business cycle model in being able
to replicate some cyclical features of the postwar U.S. economy.
We begin our analysis of the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model by solving for a benchmark
ﬁscal policy that eliminates the wedge between the social and private marginal products of
capital and labor. The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy rates applied to capital and
labor incomes, ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax. We show that the subsidy rate applied to capital
income is a key bifurcation parameter for the model’s perfect-foresight dynamics. Starting
from a laissez-faire economy that exhibits local indeterminacy, the nonlinear dynamical system
undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes suﬃciently positive and
a ﬂip bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes suﬃciently negative (representing a
capital income tax). Both bifurcations are “supercritical,” whereby an attracting orbit or cycle
emerges as the subsidy rate passes a critical value. Pushing the subsidy rate beyond the critical
value in either direction eventually leads to chaos. In these regions of the parameter space,
1Useful surveys of this large literature include Boldrin and Woodford (1990), Guesnerie and Woodford
(1992), Nishimura and Sorger (1996), Reichlin (1997), and Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
2We use the terms “animal spirits,”“sunspots,” and “self-fulﬁlling beliefs” interchangeably to mean random-
ness not related to uncertainties about economic fundamentals, i.e., technology, preferences, or endowments.
1the largest Lyapunov exponent of the nonlinear map becomes positive, indicating “sensitive
dependence on initial conditions.”
Interestingly, the subsidy rate applied to labor income has no eﬀect on the qualitative
nature of the model’s dynamics. This result is somewhat intuitive. The labor subsidy aﬀects
the tradeoﬀ between consumption and leisure at a given date while the capital subsidy aﬀects
the tradeoﬀ between consumption goods at diﬀerent dates. The inter-temporal tradeoﬀ is the
crucial mechanism for generating multiple equilibria because agents’ expectations of future
returns must become self-fulﬁlling.3 Similar logic helps to account for well-known importance
of the discount factor and the capital depreciation rate (which both aﬀect the intertemporal
tradeoﬀ) in growth models that exhibit complicated dynamics.4
For our chosen calibration, the Hopf bifurcation occurs at a capital subsidy rate of 63.8
percent. This is below the benchmark subsidy rate of 66.7 percent needed to eliminate the
wedge between the social and private marginal product of capital. Attempts by the government
to encourage private investment by setting the capital subsidy at or near 66.7 percent will
destabilize the steady state and allow for a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is
possible in the laissez-faire economy. In particular, as the subsidy rate is increased beyond the
Hopf-bifurcation value of 63.8 percent, an attracting closed orbit (invariant circle) emerges to
surround the steady state thereby allowing for quasi-periodic oscillations. Further increases in
the subsidy rate cause the orbit to break up into a complicated chaotic attractor. The high-
subsidy region is characterized by large intermittent spikes in hours worked which reﬂect a
“bunching eﬀect” in production as agents’ decisions internalize more of the increasing returns.
The ﬂip bifurcation occurs when gross income from capital is subsidized at the rate of
-8.7 percent. This subsidy rate corresponds to a steady-state tax on capital income net of
depreciation of 20.4 percent. As the capital tax rate increases, the model exhibits a series of
period-doubling bifurcations–a typical route to chaos. In this region of parameter space, the
substitution eﬀect generated by expected movements in the after-tax interest rate overcomes
the corresponding income eﬀect by an amount that is suﬃcient to induce cycling in agents’
optimal saving decisions. We observe stable 2-, 4-, and 8- cycles which eventually give way to
narrow window of chaotic dynamics. Further increases in the capital tax lead to the emergence
3Guo (1999) shows that a ﬂat rate tax or subsidy applied to labor income does aﬀect the dynamics in
the continuous-time version of the model. This occurs because the clear distinction between intra- and inter-
temporal tradeoﬀs is lost as the time step becomes vanishingly small.
4Mitra (1998) and Baierl, Nishimura, and Yano (1998) establish some conditions on the discount factor and
the capital depreciation rate that are needed for complicated dynamics in optimal growth models. Becker (1985)
shows that an economy with a capital income tax (or subsidy) can be modeled as an undistorted economy with
a appropriately-deﬁned discount factor.
2of a stable 10-cycle on the other side of the chaotic region.
For capital tax rates beyond the ﬂip-bifurcation value, the steady state exhibits saddle-
point stability. An analysis based solely on the log-linearized model would lead one to conclude
that a unique equilibrium exists in this region of the parameter space. It turns out, however,
that local determinacy of equilibrium near the steady state coexists with global indeterminacy.
Away from the steady state, there exists a continuum of perfect-foresight trajectories leading
to a stable n-period cycle or a chaotic attractor. It is possible, therefore, to construct stochastic
sunspot equilibria away from the steady state, in the vicinity of the n-period cycle or attractor.5
Finally, we demonstrate how the log-linearized model might be used to design a state-
contingent capital subsidy/tax policy that guarantees saddle-point stability of the steady-
state. This type of local control approach has been applied recently by Kass (1998) and
Barnett and He (1998, 1999) in reduced-form macroeconomic models, and by Guo and Lansing
(1998) and Guo (1999) in continuous-time versions of the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. The
important distinction here is that the model in question can exhibit global indeterminacy even
in the presence of local determinacy. This result implies that stabilization policies designed
to suppress sunspot ﬂuctuations near the steady state may not prevent sunspots, cycles, or
chaos in regions away from the steady state. Overall, our results highlight the importance of
using a model’s nonlinear equilibrium conditions to fully investigate global dynamics.
Before laying out the details of the model and the quantitative simulations, we brieﬂy
mention some other research that examines the relationship between government policy and
endogenous ﬂuctuations. Within this large literature, some researchers emphasize the use of
ﬁscal or monetary policy for stabilization purposes while others show how policy may create
an environment that is more conducive to these type of phenomena. These are two sides of
the same coin.
In the area of ﬁscal policy, Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) show that the optimal
redistributive capital tax policy in a capitalist-worker model can generate endogenous cycles
via a Hopf bifurcation. Bond, Wang, and Yip (1996) and Ben-Gad (2000) show that changes
in the level of the capital income tax can induce indeterminate balanced growth paths in
human-capital based endogenous growth models. Crès, Ghiglino, and Tvede (1997) show
that internalization of a consumption externality in an overlapping generations economy (by
means of government-sponsored legal entitlements) can generate endogenous cycles via a ﬂip
5Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) show that the existence of a stable two-cycle implies the existence of nearby
sunspot equilibria in an overlapping generations model. This result is further explored by Chattopahyay and
Muench (1999).
3bifurcation.6
Cases of global indeterminacy coexisting with local determinacy are quite common in
models with multiple steady states or multiple balanced growth paths.7 We are aware of only
a handful of examples in models with a single interior steady state, such as ours. These are
Cazzavillan (1996), Venditti (1998), Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), and Pintus,
Sands, and de Vilder (2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces ﬁscal policy into
the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. Section 3 investigates the model’s local and global dynamics
with constant subsidy/tax rates. Section 4 discusses stabilization policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of three types of agents: ﬁrms, households, and the government.
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) describe two competitive decentralizations that lead to a social
technology with increasing returns-to-scale. To simplify the exposition, we present the version
of the model with a productive externality.8
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of identical competitive ﬁrms with the total number normalized to one.




t ,θ ∈ (0,1), (1)
where yt is the ﬁrm’s output, kt and ht are the corresponding capital and labor inputs, and zt




(yt − rtkt − wtht), (2)
6Other research that considers the role of ﬁscal policy as a stabilizing or de-stabilizing force includes: Farmer
(1986), Reichlin (1986), Schleifer (1986), Deneckre and Judd (1992), Boldrin (1992), Evans and Honkapohja
(1993), Sims (1994), Goenka (1994), Cazzavillan (1996), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), and Austin (1999).
Research that considers the role of monetary policy includes: Benhabib (1980), Grandmont (1985, 1986),
Matsuyama (1991), Foley (1992), Sims (1994), Smith (1994), Woodford (1994), Chattopadhyay (1996), Matheny
(1996), Fukuda (1997), Michener and Ravikumar (1998), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001),
among others.
7See, for example, Benhabib and Perli (1994), Greiner and Semmler (1996), Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer
(1998), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998), Christiano and Harrison (1999), and, Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe (2001), among others.
8The alternative decentralization allows for monopoly power in the production of intermediate goods.
4subject to equation (1), where rt is the capital rental rate and wt is the real wage. Under the
assumption that factor markets are perfectly competitive, proﬁt maximization implies
rt = θyt/kt, (3)
wt =( 1 − θ)yt/ht. (4)
In contrast to a standard real business cycle model where zt is governed by an exogenous







,η ≥ 0, (5)
where Kt and Ht are the economywide average input levels.9 In a symmetric equilibrium, all







where α1 ≡ θ(1 + η) and α2 ≡ (1 − θ)(1+η). The social technology exhibits increasing
returns-to-scale for η>0. We restrict our attention to the case of α1 < 1 which implies that
the externality is not strong enough to generate sustained endogenous growth.10
2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely-lived households, each













,A > 0, (7)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, ct is consumption, ht is hours worked and γ ≥ 0
denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. We assume
that there are no fundamental uncertainties present in the economy.
The budget constraint faced by the household is
ct + it =( 1+skt)rtkt +( 1+sht)wtht − Tt, (8)
9Kamihigashi (1996) shows that the externality model is observationally equivalent to a standard real busi-
ness cycle model from the standpoint of individual agents who view zt as being determined outside of their
control.
10Christiano and Harrison (1999) adopt the parameterization θ =1 /3 and η =2which yields α1 =1 . For
this knife-edge case, the equilibrium marginal product of capital is independent of kt and the model’s global
dynamics collapse to a quadratic diﬀerence equation in ht and ht+1. Their setup yields two interior steady
states (a sink and a saddle) in contrast to our model which possesses a single interior steady state.
5where it is investment and kt is the household’s stock of physical capital. Households derive
income by supplying capital and labor services to ﬁrms. Fiscal policy is introduced through
the variables skt, sht, and Tt, which represent the subsidy rates applied to capital and labor
incomes, and a lump-sum tax, respectively. Under this formulation, negative subsidy rates
represent distortionary taxes and a negative value of Tt represents a lump-sum transfer received
from the government.11 Households view rt,w t,s kt,s ht, and Tt as being determined outside
of their control.
Investment adds to the stock of capital according to the law of motion
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it,k 0 given, (9)
where δ ∈ [0,1) is the constant depreciation rate. We exclude δ =1because this case is
not subject to indeterminacy in a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates. In particular, when
combined with logarithmic utility and a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the assumption
of 100 percent depreciation yields exactly oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects so that
households only need to observe the current state the economy to decide how much to consume
and invest. In this case, there exists a closed-form solution where equilibrium allocations are
uniquely pinned down by current-period fundamentals, regardless of the degree of increasing
returns.12
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are given by
Acth
γ












Equation (10) equates the household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure to the after-subsidy real wage. Equation (11) is the consumption Euler equation,
and equation (12) is the transversality condition.
11Since skt is applied to gross income from capital, a negative subsidy rate is equivalent to a tax on capital
income net of depreciation of τkt =1−
(1+skt)rt−δ
rt−δ , where skt < 0 and δ is the capital depreciation rate.





, where yt is given by equation (6) and sk and sh are the constant subsidy/tax rates.
62.3 Government
The government sets {skt,s ht,T t}
∞
t=0 , subject to the following budget constraint:
Tt = sktrtkt + shtwtht. (13)
By combining equations (6), (8), (9), and (13), we obtain the following aggregate resource





t +( 1− δ)kt − ct. (14)
3 Dynamics with Constant Subsidy/Tax Rates
The increasing-returns technology (6) introduces a nonconvexity into the constraint set of the
social planner’s problem.13 This nonconvexity presents a formidable technical barrier for policy
analysis because it precludes application of the Kuhn-Tucker suﬃciency theorem to (i) compute
the ﬁrst-best allocations and (ii) solve for the optimal ﬁscal policy that would implement the
ﬁrst-best as a competitive equilibrium. This barrier cannot be surmounted simply by resorting
to a numerical analysis. A complete characterization of the ﬁrst-best allocations in a dynamic
economy with increasing returns is an unsolved problem that we leave as an open question for
future research.14 As an alternative to computing the optimal ﬁscal policy, we consider the
following benchmark ﬁscal policy that eliminates the wedge between the social and private
marginal products of capital and labor.
Proposition. The wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital and labor
is eliminated when
skt = sht = η, for all t, (15)
Tt = ηyt, for all t. (16)
Proof : The social marginal products from equation (6) are
∂yt
∂kt = α1yt/kt and
∂yt
∂ht = α2yt/kt.
The after-subsidy private marginal products are (1 + skt)rt and (1 + sht)wt, where rt and wt
are given by equations (3) and (4). With skt = sht = η, we have (1 + skt)rt = α1yt/kt
and (1 + sht)wt = α2yt/kt. The lump-sum tax needed to ﬁnance the subsidies follows directly
from equation (13). 
13The social planner chooses {ct,h t,k t+1}
∞
t=0 to maximize (7) subject to equation (14), with k0 given.
14Gaines and Peterson (1985) show existence but not uniqueness of the ﬁrst-best allocations in a growth
model with increasing returns-to-scale. Dechert and Nishimura (1983) establish some features of the ﬁrst-best
allocations when the technology exhibits increasing returns-to-scale for an initial range of capital stocks but
decreasing returns thereafter.
7The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy rates that are linked directly to the ex-
ternality parameter η. A similar result is obtained in models where the productive externality
(or the degree of monopoly power) does not give rise to increasing returns. In those models,
unlike here, the Kuhn-Tucker suﬃciency theorem can be used to show that the benchmark
ﬁscal policy implements the unique ﬁrst-best allocations.15
We now turn to a quantitative investigation of the model’s local and global dynamics under
a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates, that is, when skt = sk and sht = sh for all t.
3.1 Calibration
Parameter values are chosen based on empirically observed features of the U.S. economy. The
time period in the model is taken to be one year. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter
values, together with a brief description of the rationale used in their selection.
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Value Rationale
θ 0.30 Capital share in U.S. national income, see Poterba (1997, Table 4).
β 0.962 Implies after-tax interest rate of 4 percent, see Poterba (1997, Table 1).
A 2.876 Implies fraction of time spent working =0 .3, see Juster and Staﬀord (1991).
γ 0 Indivisible labor, see Hansen (1985).
δ 0.067 Estimated from annual U.S. data on kt and it, 1954-1992.
η 2/3 Implies local indeterminacy in the laissez-faire version of the model.
With the exception of the externality parameter η, the baseline parameter settings are
consistent with those typically used in real business cycle models. The degree of returns-to-
scale in the model economy is given by 1+η. Basu and Fernald (1997) note that returns-to-scale
estimates reported in the literature vary dramatically depending on the type of data used, the
level of aggregation, and the estimation method. In attempting to account for the wide
range of estimates, Basu and Fernald (1997) demonstrate that while the average U.S. industry
exhibits approximately constant returns-to-scale, the aggregate private business economy can
appear to exhibit large increasing returns. The largest aggregate estimate they obtain is
1.72 (standard error = 0.36).16 However, when the aggregate returns-to-scale estimation
procedure is corrected to account for reallocation of inputs across industries, Basu and Fernald
(1997) ﬁnd that the aggregate estimates shrink considerably and are close to the industry
results. The largest corrected aggregate estimate they obtain is 1.03 (standard error = 0.18).17
15See, for example, Puhakka and Wright (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Guo and Lansing
(1999a).
16See the ﬁrst column of Table 1 (p. 259) in Basu and Fernald (1997).
17See the ﬁrst column of Table 3 (p. 268) in Basu and Fernald (1997).
8Despite these ﬁndings, Basu and Fernald (1997, Section V) note that the uncorrected aggregate
estimates may actually be more appropriate for calibrating models (such as ours) that abstract
from heterogeneity in production and assume a single representative ﬁrm. This argument turns
out to be helpful for our purposes because it is well-known that one-sector growth models of
the type considered here require strong increasing returns for indeterminacy.
Given the other baseline parameter values, our model requires returns-to-scale in excess
of approximately 1.6 to exhibit local indeterminacy (a point which is discussed further below
in reference to Figure 1). We choose η =2 /3 for the quantitative experiments which implies
returns-to-scale of about 1.67. This calibration yields an indeterminate steady state (a sink) in
the laissez-faire version of the model, consistent with Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer
and Guo (1994). While our returns-to-scale calibration falls within the range of uncorrected
aggregate estimates reported by Basu and Fernald (1997, Table 1), we acknowledge that a
ﬁgure of 1.67 may be viewed as too large to be considered empirically plausible for the U.S.
economy. We note, for example, that Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995) obtain an
aggregate returns-to-scale estimate of 0.98 (standard error = 0.34) after correcting for cyclical
variation in the utilization of physical capital.18 To the extent that one objects to our returns-
to-scale calibration, the quantitative experiments reported below should be viewed more from a
methodological perspective as illustrating the pitfalls that can arise from focusing exclusively
on log-linearized dynamics rather than considering the model’s true nonlinear equilibrium
conditions.19
3.2 Log-Linearized Dynamics
In the appendix, we show that the perfect-foresight version of the model can be approximated

























,k 0 given, (17)
where ¯ k and ¯ c represent steady-state values and J is a 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix of partial
derivatives evaluated at the steady state. The elements of J are constructed using the constants
λi,i=1 ,2,3,4 which represent combinations of the model parameters θ, β, δ, γ, η, and sk.
18Cole and Ohanian (1999) show that measurements of aggregate returns-to-scale in the U.S. economy are
unavoidably imprecise due to the diﬃculties in identifying technology shocks.
19Models that allow for multiple sectors of production or varying capital utilization can exhibit local indeter-
minacy for a much lower (and hence more realistic) degree of increasing returns. For examples, see Benhabib
and Farmer (1996), Perli (1998), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), and Wen (1998a).
9The ﬁrst-order dynamical system possesses one predetermined variable: kt. The eigenvalues
of J determine the stability of the log-linear system. The labor subsidy rate sh does not
appear in J and thus has no aﬀect on the model’s local stability properties. The household
equilibrium conditions provide some intuition for this result. Equation (10) shows that sh
aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between consumption and leisure at a given date while equation (11)
shows that sk aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between consumption goods at diﬀerent dates. The inter-
temporal tradeoﬀ is the crucial mechanism for generating multiple equilibria because agents’
expectations of future returns must become self-fulﬁlling.20
Table 2 summarizes the model’s local stability properties as we vary the capital subsidy
rate sk over a wide range.
Table 2: Stability Properties Near the Steady State
Capital Subsidy Rate Eigenvalues of Jacobian Matrix Steady State
sk < −0.0869 real µ1 < −1, |µ2| < 1 saddle
sk = −0.0869 (ﬂip bifurcation) real µ1 = −1, |µ2| < 1 saddle changes to sink
−0.0869 <s k < 0.2399 real |µ1| < 1, |µ2| < 1 sink
0.2399 <s k < 0.6380 complex |µ1| = |µ2| < 1 sink
sk =0 .6380 (Hopf bifurcation) complex |µ1| = |µ2| =1 , sink changes to source
sk > 0.6380 complex |µ1| = |µ2| > 1 source
3.3 Local Indeterminacy
When both eigenvalues of J lie inside the unit circle, the steady state is indeterminate (a sink)
and the economy is subject to the same type of stochastic sunspot ﬂuctuations as in the original
Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model. Figure 1 plots the combinations of η (the externality parameter)
and sk (the capital subsidy rate) that allow for local indeterminacy. Recall that the degree
of returns-to-scale in the model economy is given by 1+η. When η =0(constant returns-to-
scale), the model exhibits saddle-point stability for all values of sk. From the ﬁgure, we see
that η>0.5937 is needed for the steady state to become a sink. Given η>0.5937, increases
in sk eventually transform the steady state into a source while decreases in sk eventually
transform the steady state into a saddle point. For our calibration with η =2 /3   0.6667,
local indeterminacy occurs for subsidy rates in the range −0.0869 <s k < 0.6380. The model
exhibits a locally unique equilibrium (a saddle point) for sk < −0.0869. This subsidy rate
corresponds to a steady-state tax on capital income net of depreciation of τk =0 .2042.21
20However, as mentioned in footnote 3, this intuition does not extend to the continuous-time version of the
model because there is no clear distinction between the intra- and inter-temporal tradeoﬀs when the time step
becomes vanishingly small.
21See footnote 11. Auerbach (1996) estimates the eﬀective marginal tax rate on capital income under the
current U.S. tax code. He obtains an estimate of 0.26 for nonresidential capital and 0.06 for residential capital.
10Hence, a government that wishes to stabilize the economy against sunspot ﬂuctuations near
the steady state can do so simply by imposing a suﬃciently high tax rate on capital income.
As we shall see, however, such a policy can open the door to other forms of endogenous
ﬂuctuations–those arising from global indeterminacy.
3.4 Hopf Bifurcation
For our calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as sk is increased past
the value s
Hopf
k =0 .6380. The eigenvalues of J are complex conjugates and cross the unit
circle with non-zero speed.22 The steady state changes stability from a sink to a source and a
closed orbit (invariant circle) emerges to surround the steady state. At the bifurcation point,
we have det(J) =1 .23 Using the expression for det(J) derived in the appendix, we solve for





δ (1 + γ)+α2 (1 − δ)(1− β)
− 1, (18)
where ρ ≡ 1
β − 1 is the household’s rate of time preference. Since the externality parameter η
enters equation (18) in a multiplicative way, it is not immediately obvious whether the Hopf
bifurcation occurs above or below the benchmark subsidy rate sk = η derived earlier in Section
3. For our calibration, it turns out that s
Hopf
k <η . 24 Thus, attempts by the government to
close the wedge between the social and private marginal products of capital by setting sk at
or near η =2 /3 will destabilize the steady state and allow for a much richer set of endogenous
dynamics than is possible in the laissez-faire economy.
While the Hopf bifurcation theorem proves the existence of a closed orbit, it does not
tell us whether the orbit is stable. There are two cases to consider. In a supercritical Hopf
bifurcation, an attracting orbit emerges on the side of s
Hopf
k where the steady state is unstable
(in our case a source), that is, in the small neighborhood s
Hopf
k + ε. In a subcritical Hopf
bifurcation, a repelling orbit emerges on the side of s
Hopf
k where the steady state is stable
(in our case a sink), that is, in the small neighborhood s
Hopf
k − ε. Both cases have economic
interpretations, as noted by Benhabib and Miyao (1981). An attracting orbit can be viewed
These estimates combine to yield an overall eﬀective marginal tax rate of 0.16.
22The Hopf bifurcation in discrete time is also called the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. For formal descriptions,
see Medio (1999), pp. 102-103 and Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983), pp 160-165.
23See Azariadis (1993), p. 93.
24In the continuous-time version of the model, it can be shown analytically that s
Hopf
k <ηwhenever α2−1 >
γ, that is, whenever the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for local indeterminacy in a laissez-faire economy
is satisﬁed.
11as a stylized business cycle while a repelling orbit accompanied by an attracting steady-state
resembles the “corridor of stability” concept described by Leijonhufvud (1973).25
It is possible to distinguish between the two cases analytically by implementing a coordinate
transformation and examining the sign of a coeﬃcient in the third-order Taylor series expansion
of the transformed dynamical system.26 Since the calculation is extremely tedious, we resort
to numerical simulations to establish that the Hopf bifurcation in our model is supercritical.27
The supercritical Hopf bifurcation allows the model to exhibit deterministic, quasi-periodic
oscillations that never converge to the steady state. Moreover, because the invariant circle is
an attractor, there exists a continuum of perfect-foresight trajectories each leading to the
circle. It is possible, therefore, to construct stochastic sunspot equilibria in the vicinity of the
circle that remain away from the steady state. This is a form of global indeterminacy.
3.5 Flip Bifurcation
For our calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation as sk is reduced past
the value s
Flip
k = −0.0867. One eigenvalue of J remains inside the unit circle while the other
eigenvalue crosses the unit circle at −1 with non-zero speed.28 The steady state changes
stability from a sink to a saddle and a two-cycle emerges with points on either side of the
steady state. The two-cycle is aligned in the direction of the eigenvector associated with the
eigenvalue −1. At the bifurcation point, we have det(J) + tr(J) = −1.29 Using the expressions




(ρ + δ)(1+γ)[2α1 + β (ρ + δ)(1− α1)]/θ
(4 − 2δ)(α2 − 1 − γ)+β (ρ + δ)[δ (1 + γ)(1− α1) − 2α2]
− 1. (19)
As with the Hopf bifurcation, there are two cases to consider regarding stability. In a
supercritical ﬂip bifurcation, an attracting two-cycle emerges on the side of s
Flip
k where the
steady state is unstable (in our case a saddle), that is, in the small neighborhood s
Flip
k −ε.I na
subcritical ﬂip bifurcation, a repelling two-cycle emerges on the side of s
Flip
k where the steady
state is stable (in our case a sink), that is, in the small neighborhood s
Flip
k + ε. Although an
25Some helpful diagrams depicting the two cases can be found in Cugno and Montrucchio (1984).
26See Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983), pp 163-165. For examples of such calculations, see Foley (1992) and
Drugeon and Venditti (2001).
27Our method of verifying stability avoids a potential pitfall of the analytical calculation. Kind (1999) shows
that the third-order Taylor series coeﬃcient may indicate a subcritical Hopf bifurcation (normally associated
with a repelling orbit) when in fact an attracting outer orbit surrounds the repelling inner orbit. This phenomena
is described as a “crater” bifurcation.
28For a formal description of the ﬂip bifurcation (which can only occur in discrete time), see Guckenheimer
and Holmes (1983), pp 156-160.
29See Azariadis (1993), p. 93.
12analytical calculation can be used to distinguish between the two cases, we again resort to
numerical simulations to establish that the ﬂip bifurcation in our model is supercritical.30
The supercritical ﬂip bifurcation allows the model to exhibit deterministic cycles that
never converge to the steady state. The two-cycle is an attractor, so it is possible to construct
stochastic sunspot equilibria in the vicinity of the cycle that remain away from the steady
state–another form of global indeterminacy. In this case, the global indeterminacy coexists
with local determinacy because the steady state is a saddle point for sk < −0.0867. This
result implies that stabilization policies designed using the log-linearized model may backﬁre.
In particular, setting sk < −0.0867 to suppress sunspot ﬂuctuations near the steady state can
open the door to sunspots, cycles, or even chaos, in regions away from the steady state. We
will return to this point later in Section 4 in our discussion of local control policies.
3.6 Nonlinear Dynamics




































To investigate the global dynamics, we iterate the above map for a range of values of sk,
holding sh =0 .31 The iteration proceeds as follows. Given k0 and an arbitrarily chosen c0, we
solve equation (20) for k1. Substituting the value of k1 into equation (21) yields a nonlinear
equation that can be solved numerically for c1. The procedure is then repeated to compute k2,
c2 and so on. In practice, we use k0 = ¯ k and c0 ∈ [1.01¯ c,1.09¯ c], where ¯ k and ¯ c are the steady-
state values implied by the settings of sk and sh. The number of iterations is chosen to ensure
that the limiting behavior of the model is not aﬀected by the particular starting values. While
our model is deterministic, the qualitative properties of the nonlinear map should be robust
to the introduction of small stochastic disturbances.32 It is possible, therefore, to construct
30The analytical calculation is described by Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983), pp 156-160. For an example,
see Becker and Foias (1994).
31Although sh does not aﬀect the model dynamics, it does aﬀect the range of values of ht observed during the
simulations. We set sh =0to ensure ht ≤ 1, consistent with our assumption of a time endowment normalized
to one.
32This has been demonstrated formally using the discrete logistic map by Crutchﬁeld, Farmer, and Huberman
(1982). Benhabib and Nishimura (1989) show that a stable two-cycle in a deterministic economy generalizes to
the concept of “cyclic sets” in an economy subject to stochastic shocks.
13global sunspot equilibria simply by appending a stochastic disturbance term to equation (21).
Figures 2 through 10 illustrate the simulation results.
Figure 2 plots the bifurcation diagram and the largest Lyapunov exponent over the range





bifurcation diagram summarizes the long-run behavior of the model by plotting the last 150
points of a very long simulation. The Lyapunov exponent measures the average exponential
rate of divergence of trajectories with nearby starting points. The presence of one or more
positive Lyapunov exponents is an indicator of “sensitive dependence on initial conditions”–a
commonly-used deﬁnition of chaos.
We compute the Lyapunov exponents according to the procedure described by Alligood,





∂ct are computed numerically by log-linearizing equation
(21) around each successive point of the trajectory generated by the nonlinear map. This
introduces some approximation error into our computation so that values of the Lyapunov
exponent which are only slightly above zero (those in the range 0.635 ≤ sk ≤ 0.645) are not





k in either direction eventually leads to chaos as indicated by a
signiﬁcantly positive Lyapunov exponent. The transition to chaos takes place via a “quasi-













. Both of these routes to chaos are common in nonlinear
maps, as noted by Medio (1998).
Figures 5 through 10 depict various forms of endogenous ﬂuctuations as sk takes on diﬀerent
values. Figures 5 and 6 verify that the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical as evidenced by the
attracting nature of the invariant circle. When sk = s
Hopf
k +0.002, perfect foresight trajectories
eventually converge to the invariant circle for arbitrary starting points either inside or outside
of the circle. Figure 7 shows that the invariant circle starts break up into irregular cycles when
the subsidy rate is slightly increased to sk = s
Hopf
k +0.007. Figure 8 shows that a complicated
chaotic attractor emerges when the subsidy rate is further increased to sk = s
Hopf
k +0 .051.
Although not plotted separately, the model exhibits stable 2- 4- and 8-cycles for subsidy rates
in the range −0.133 <s k <s
Flip
k . While theory tells us that there are an inﬁnite number
of period-doublings in the cascade, the corresponding intervals of sk are too narrow for the
33For values of sk outside this range, we found that the nonlinear map would often converge to the zero
steady state (which is also an attractor). The Gauss programs used to construct the ﬁgures are available from
the authors upon request.
14higher integer cycles to be observed in the bifurcation diagram. In Figure 9, we see that
another type of chaotic attractor emerges when the subsidy rate is reduced to sk = −0.13435.
Figure 10 shows that a stable 10-cycle emerges when the subsidy rate is further reduced to
sk = −0.13510.
Changes in sk aﬀect the amplitude of the cycles or oscillations. The high-subsidy region is
characterized by large intermittent spikes in hours worked and output which reﬂect a “bunching
eﬀect” in production as agents’ decisions internalize more of the increasing returns. In the
negative-subsidy region, the substitution eﬀect generated by expected movements in the after-
tax interest rate overcomes the corresponding income eﬀect by an amount that is suﬃcient to
induce cycling in agents’ optimal saving decisions. These stable cycles can only be observed in
the nonlinear model. Once the model is log-linearized, any perturbation away from the stable-
manifold leads to explosive behavior because the crucial nonlinear terms that are needed to
keep the oscillations bounded are no longer present.
The time series plots in Figures 5 through 10 reveal large percentage changes in model
output. The amplitudes are much larger than those observed in the postwar U.S. economy
at business cycle frequencies. The model behavior can be traced to the presence of strong
increasing returns. It would be interesting to conduct similar experiments in a multi-sector
framework or one with varying capital utilization to ascertain whether qualitatively similar
ﬂuctuations can be obtained with a lower degree of increasing returns. Such a model may be




Given the model’s susceptibility to endogenous ﬂuctuations, it is natural to ask whether the
government should try to stabilize the economy through some type of activist ﬁscal policy.
Standard second-best analysis tells us that there is no deﬁnitive answer to this normative
question. In our model, a ﬂuctuating economy and its stabilized counterpart will both be
Pareto-inferior due to the presence of the productive externality. A priori, we cannot rank
these economies from a welfare standpoint. Monte Carlo simulations are unlikely to settle the
matter because the results will depend on the assumed ﬁscal policy in the baseline economy
(which governs the nature of the endogenous ﬂuctuations to be stabilized) and the assumed
variance of a sunspot shock (which can be present whenever the baseline economy exhibits
15local or global indeterminacy). Welfare questions are further complicated by our lack of knowl-
edge regarding the ﬁrst-best allocations for this economy. In other environments, the ﬁrst-best
allocations provide an important benchmark for judging the desirability of stabilization pol-
icy.34 Finally, we note that Grandmont (1985) makes a case for stabilization policy even when
endogenous ﬂuctuations are Pareto-optimal. He argues that complicated endogenous dynam-
ics may prevent agents from learning enough about their environment to support convergence
to a rational expectations equilibrium.35
In light of the many complex issues aﬀecting the desirability of stabilization policy for this
economy, we restrict our attention to questions of feasibility. In what follows, we describe
some policy mechanisms that can suppress sunspot ﬂuctuations near the steady state.
4.2 Local Control
Here we demonstrate how the log-linearized model might be used to design a state-contingent
capital subsidy/tax policy that selects a locally unique equilibrium by ensuring saddle-point
stability of the steady-state. To design the policy, we ﬁrst replace the constant subsidy rate sk
in the Euler equation (21) with its state-contingent counterpart skt+1. Assuming that house-
holds view the subsidy rate as being determined outside of their control, we can construct the


































(1 + ¯ sk)
 
, (22)
where λ5 = β (ρ + δ) and ¯ sk represents the steady-state subsidy rate. Our decision to linearize
around ln(1 + ¯ sk), as opposed to ln(¯ sk), allows for negative subsidy rates and maintains the
elements of J unchanged from before.

















where d1 and d2 are control parameters that govern the response of skt to the lagged state

























,k 0 given. (24)
34Deneckere and Judd (1992) examine the welfare implications of stabilization policy in a model where it can
be shown that the unique ﬁrst-best allocations do not exhibit endogenous ﬂuctuations.
35For additional discussion of the welfare implications of stabilization policy in models with endogenous
ﬂuctuations, see Guesnerie and Woodford (1992, secion 8.2) and Bullard and Butler (1993).
16The basic idea behind local control is to choose d1 and d2 such that the above log-linear
system exhibits saddle point stability. This requires one eigenvalue of J1 to lie inside the unit
circle and the other eigenvalue to lie outside. Figure 11 plots the combinations of d1 and d2 that
achieve the desired outcome, depending on the assumed value of ¯ sk. A systematic approach to
local control would optimize among the many candidate combinations of d1 and d2 according
to some stabilization criterion. For example, Kaas (1998) chooses control parameters such
that the reduced-form Jacobian (J1 in our case) projects onto the linearization of the stable
manifold. By applying linear optimal control theory, Barnett and He (1998, 1999) choose
control parameters to minimize a weighted combination of the variances of state and control
variables.
Some applications of local control have appeared recently in the indeterminacy literature.
We brieﬂy discuss some examples that are closely related to our analysis. Guo and Lansing
(1998) show that a progressive income tax can ensure saddle-point stability of the steady state













where τt is the tax rate, φ is the slope of the tax schedule, and yt is current output. Since the
log-linearized equilibrium conditions can be used to express yt in terms of kt−1, ct−1, and τt,
equation (25) can be viewed as a special case of equation (23).36
Georges (1995) shows that adjustment costs applied to jump variables can be used to
select a locally unique equilibrium. One application of this idea, discussed by Wen (1998b),
is a time-to-build capital accumulation technology. Similarly, explicit adjustment costs for
capital investment can be used to select a locally unique equilibrium. To see how this works,





















= wtht + rtkt. (26)
where it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt and ψ ≥ 0. Following Abel and Blanchard (1983), adjustment
costs are modeled here as a premium τt (·) paid for each unit of investment goods relative
to consumption goods. From equation (26), adjustment costs are observationally equivalent
36Guo and Lansing (1998) assume that tax revenues are used to ﬁnance wasteful government expenditures
whereas here we assume that tax revenues are rebated to households in a lump sum manner. This diﬀerence
has no aﬀect on the results.
17to a state-contingent tax on investment; households internalize the impact of their actions
on the tax rate and tax revenues are simply thrown away. The adjustment cost parameter
ψ now serves as a bifurcation parameter for the model’s perfect-foresight dynamics. For our
calibration, the dynamical system undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation as ψ is increased past the value
ψFlip =0 .3689. At this point, the steady state changes stability from a sink to a saddle and a
two-cycle emerges with points on either side of the steady state.
The above examples show that there are many ways to select a locally unique equilibrium.
Nevertheless, these examples suﬀer from the drawback of being based on a log-linear approxi-
mation. When global indeterminacy coexists with local determinacy as it can here, equilibrium
selection mechanisms designed using the approximating model may prove unsuccessful when
introduced into the true nonlinear model.37
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the introduction of a constant capital tax or subsidy in the
Benhabib-Farmer-Guo model can lead to a much richer set of endogenous dynamics than is
possible in the laissez-faire version of the model. The nonlinear dynamical system undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation as the capital subsidy rate becomes suﬃciently positive, and a ﬂip bifurcation
as the capital subsidy rate becomes suﬃciently negative (representing a capital income tax).
The model’s perfect-foresight dynamics allow for stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and 10-cycles, quasi-periodic
orbits, and chaos. None of these phenomena can be observed in the log-linearized version of
the model. For a plausible range of capital tax rates, local determinacy of equilibrium near the
steady state coexists with global indeterminacy. This implies that stabilization mechanisms
designed using a log-linearized model may not prevent cycles, sunspots, or chaos away from
the steady state. Overall, our results caution against the use of local steady-state analysis to
make inferences about the global behavior of a nonlinear economic model.
37In the working paper version of this article, Guo and Lansing (1999b), we show how the nonlinear equilib-
rium conditions might be used to design a state-contingent ﬁscal policy that selects a globally unique equilibrium.
The global stabilization policy creates an environment where the income and substitution eﬀects of future in-
terest rate movements exactly cancel out. As a result, equilibrium allocations are uniquely pinned down by
current-period fundamentals, regardless of the degree of increasing returns.
18AA p p e n d i x
This appendix summarizes the equations used to investigate the model’s perfect-foresight
dynamics under a regime of constant subsidy/tax rates where skt = sk and sht = sh for all t.





t +( 1− δ)kt − ct,k 0 given, (A.1)
Acth
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For the parameter values in Table 1, it is straightforward to show that the above economy










which can be used to eliminate ht from equations (A.1) and (A.3) thus yielding equations (20)
and (21) in the text.
In the vicinity of the steady state, equations (20) and (21) can be approximated by the


























where the elements that make up the Jacobian matrix J are given by:
λ1 =1 − δ −
(1 + γ)(ρ + δ)(1+η)
(α2 − 1 − γ)(1+sk)
, (A.5)
λ2 = δ +
(1 + γ)(ρ + δ)
(α2 − 1 − γ)(1+sk)θ
, (A.6)
λ3 = −β (ρ + δ)
 
(1 + γ)α1 + α2 − 1 − γ
α2 − 1 − γ
 
, (A.7)
λ4 =1 − β (ρ + δ)
 
α2
α2 − 1 − γ
 
, (A.8)
where ρ ≡ 1
β − 1 is the household’s rate of time preference. Notice that the elements of J do
not depend on the labor disutility parameter A or the labor subsidy rate sh. Hence, the labor
subsidy rate has no aﬀect the model’s local stability properties.
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